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Analysis of managerial efficiency in sport economics typically focuses on evaluating 
coach decisions instead of assessing the organization as a whole. This paper studies 
the relative importance of variables related to power and managerial decisions by 
estimating stochastic production frontiers models for the Chilean and Italian 
football. We find the presence of technical inefficiencies in both cases. However, 
managerial decisions play a more significant role in the Italian league. This difference 
can be explained by a less open and balanced competition in the Chilean case, that 
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The empirical analysis of the factors that determine technical 
inefficiencies in the sport industry has been a topic of intense research in the 
economic and sport literature; see Hofler and Payne (2006), Kahane (2005) 
and Simmons and Frick (2008).  In these studies, the focus is mainly on the 
ability of one layer of  management (the coach) to extract the best possible 
performance from the players given his budget (Kahane, 2005 and Simmons 
and Frick, 2008) or team strategy (Hofler and Payne, 2006) but not on the 
overall ability of the organization to transform its potential power over 
resources to the best possible outcome. 
Estimating the overall efficiency of different organizations in dealing 
with their resources is relevant in the field of industrial organization.  
However, this is usually not an easy task, mainly because of the difficulties 
one has to face in order to obtain good proxies of some unobservable 
variables, such as “power” or “performance” of the different firms in a given 
industry.  The analysis of sport results and its correlation with some features 
of the clubs that can be thought to be related to endowment provides a 
plausible answer to this issue.  For example, Buraimo et al. (2007) report 
high correlation, for the 92 clubs in English professional football, between 
the potential of a club (as represented by variables capturing its geography 
and history) and both the club’s revenue and its ranking in the league.  This 
is also consistent with the central proposition of the most influential 
theoretical model in sports economics, the two team league model of El-
Hodiri and Quirk (1971), that large market clubs will dominate small market 
clubs because they generate greater revenue and hire better players.  For 
example, a club may be located in a large city and have won many trophies in 
the past. This ‘big’ club would therefore have a larger fan and revenue base 
that its rivals and greater power in the player labour market.  If both clubs 
are managed efficiently, the ‘big’ club is expected to win more matches than 
the small club.  
This paper is an empirical analysis on the presence of x-inefficiency 
in the top division of the Chilean and Italian football leagues through the 
estimation of stochastic production frontiers.  According to the previous 
discussion, our econometric specification relates team performance to a set 
of power indicators (history and past results) while stochastic deviations of 
this function can be explained by managerial decision variables.  Moreover, 
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the comparative analysis of these two extreme cases, one a very modest 
league and the other amongst the richest in the world, is a novel aspect of 
our paper compared to related literature on sport, which usually focuses on a 
single national league.  This comparison is especially interesting given that, 
compared to the Italian league, clubs in the Chilean league are in principle 
more likely to be affected by financial restrictions that prevent them from 
achieving the highest possible performance.   
    We find evidence of technical inefficiencies in both the Chilean and the 
Italian leagues.  However, an important difference is that, in the Italian 
league, a significant share of team performance is due to stochastic shocks 
related to the efficiency of club management; by contrast, stochastic 
elements do not play a significant role in the Chilean league.  This difference 
can be explained by a less open and balanced competition in the Chilean case 
that could be due to financial constraints faced by small clubs in that 
country. 
    In the next section of the paper, we present and describe the variables 
used in the analysis and in Section 3 we explain the econometric approach 
used to estimate the impact of resource variables and technical inefficiencies 
on output in the Chilean and Italian football and discusses the results of the 
estimation. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4. 
 
2. Data on the Italian and Chilean football league. 
Our season-level variables relate to the period from 1992/93 to 
2007/08 in the case of Italy and from season 1993 to 2008 in the case of 
Chile. The following variables are considered in both cases 
Output (performance) measure 
 (i) Number of points divided by the maximum available for the ith 
team in season t (𝑦𝑖,𝑡). Although during sample period the number of points 
awarded for a victory changed from two to three in season 1995/96 for the 
Italian league and 1996 for the Chilean league, to make the performance 
measure consistent across seasonswe computed it on the basis of three 
points for a win throughout the whole period. A dummy variable is used in 
the estimation to represent the seasons when three points was actually 
employed as the change in incentives was likely to have influenced the 




Group I (variables related to resources) 
 
 (ii) International tournament (𝑥1,𝑖,𝑡): dummy that takes the value 1 
when club i is playing in that season's European Champion League (Italy) or 
Copa de Libertadores (Chile) at season t. 
 (iii) Stadium capacity (𝑥2,𝑖,𝑡). 
 (iv) Population size of the city (where the team plays its home 
games) (𝑥3,𝑖,𝑡). 
 (v) Champion in previous years (𝑥4,𝑖,𝑡): a weighted sum of the 
number of national league trophies in the previous three years. The weights 
were (1/t²) where t was 1 for the previous season, 2 for the season before 
and 3 for the season before that. 
 (vi) Performance in previous years (𝑥5,𝑖,𝑡): a weighted measure of 
the inverse of the ranking of each team in each of the top division 
competitions in the preceding three years. Weights are defined similarly to 
the previous variable. 
 (vi) Capital city (𝑥6,𝑖,𝑡): a dummy variable that takes the value one 
when the team plays in the capital of the country, Santiago de Chile in the 
case of Chile and Rome in the case of Italy.  
Group II (variables related to technical decisions) 
 (viii) Total number of players (𝑧1,𝑡,𝑡): total number of footballers in 
each squad. 
 (ix) Number of foreigners (𝑧2,𝑖,𝑡):: total number of foreigners for 
each club. 
 (x) % goalkeepers (𝑧3,𝑖,𝑡): share of goalkeepers in the squad. 
 (xi) % defenders (𝑧4,𝑖,𝑡): share of defenders in the squad. 
(xii) % midfielders (𝑧5,𝑖,𝑡): share of midfielders in the squad.  
 (xiii) Number of high scoring players (𝑧6,𝑖,𝑡): number of players at 
each club who had scored more than twenty goals in the previous season. 
(xiv) Manager quality (𝑧7,𝑖,𝑡): proportion of matches won during the 
career of the manager of the club prior to season t. 
 (xv) Manager experience (𝑧8,𝑖,𝑡): number of years that the coach of 
the team has been involved in managerial activities. 
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 (xvi) Foreign manager (𝑧9𝑖,𝑡): a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 when the manager is a foreigner and zero otherwise. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
    The model of stochastic frontier production functions was 
initially developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck 
(1977) and extended to panel data by Battese and Coelli (1995). The standard 
specification for a set of firms indexed by i over a number of periods t can 
be represented as: 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + �𝜈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡�  𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁;   𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇            (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is a measure of firm i’s output at time t, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of the 
inputs defined in the previous section and β is a vector of unknown 
coefficients to be estimated. A common practice in the literature is to take 
logs of variables 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑥𝑖,𝑡. However, here we do not apply this 
transformation of the dependent variable as it is already defined as a ratio 
(points divided by maximum possible points in a season)1
The remainder of the equation is an error term composed of two 
components:1) 𝜈𝑖,𝑡 is a random error term assumed to be𝑖𝑖𝑑~𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜈2); 
and2) 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 is a non-negative random error term that is assumed to be 
independent and following a normal distribution that is truncated at zero and 
𝑖𝑖𝑑~𝑁�𝑚𝑖,𝑡 ,𝜎𝜎𝜐2� with mean inefficiency, 𝑚𝑖,𝑡, modelled as a function of 
various firm-level factors. Specifically, 
𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿′𝑧𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖,𝑡                                              (2) 
. 
where𝑧𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of technical decisions undertaken by firm i in period t 
and 𝛿𝛿 is another vector of coefficients to be estimated. The error term is 
assumed to be 𝑖𝑖𝑑~𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑤2) truncated at −𝛿𝛿′𝑧𝑖,𝑡 for consistency with the 
assumption that 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 is non-negative and truncated at zero. 
The model presented in equations (1) and (2) is estimated following 
the maximum likelihood method proposed by Battese and Coelli (1993) and 
made available in Coelli's (1996) computer program FRONTIER 4.1. The 
parameter 𝛾𝛾 = (𝜎𝜎𝜐2)/(𝜎𝜎𝜈2 + 𝜎𝜎𝜐2).takes values in [0,1] and it is particularly 
important as it shows the proportion of the sum of the two error variances 
that is accounted by technical inefficiencies.  When this parameter is not 
6 
 
statistically different from zero then it is not possible to reject the null 
hypothesis of zero technical inefficiencies and the specification should be a 
standard panel data econometric procedure to estimate the production 
function.   
As discussed in the introduction, since our focus is not specifically 
on coach but on the efficiency of the organization as a whole, the 
production frontier is not taken by relating performance to the quality of the 
playing staff at the club as proxied by its total wage bill. Another important 
reason for not including the wage bill in this study is that the size of the 
budget at each club was not available at all in the case of Chile; even for 
Italy, the figures for wage bills were probably unreliable  - either because 
clubs had an incentive to misreport or simply because complex bonus 
arrangements make it hard to represent a club's financial commitment with a 
single summary figure2
Accordingly, our Group I explanatory variables, the 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 in equation 
(1), seek to represent factors from the geography and history of the club that 
should, collectively, determine its power to command resources. The task of 
management in the organization is to translate power into output (points). 
Decisions are, of course, taken at a number of levels in the club. In the 
stylized club we have in mind, the owners (perhaps represented by the 
chairman) or other senior managers hire a coach. The coach is then co-opted 
into management and may well have some input in the recruitment of the 
playing staff with whatever budget has been made available (in some cases a 
director of football will play the primary role here). Errors of judgment may 
be made, for example, by the chairman (who may choose a lower quality 
coach to work with the more expensive players whom the club can then 
afford) or by the director of football (who may use his budget to hire a sub-
optimal balance of stars and journeymen or international and local players). 
Poor decisions at any level of management will prevent the club from 
reaching the level of performance (in terms of league points) that should be 
possible given its power and status. In our specification of equation (2) 
above, the 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 (the Group II variables) represent a selection of such 
technical decisions. Studying them would not yield any conclusions if the 
.  Note also that, given their focus on coaching ability, 
the wage bill is properly taken as exogenous in the empirical models of 
Kahane (2005) and Simmons and Frick (2008) but its size will in fact be 
influenced by expected team performance that year.  
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management team at every club operated with maximum efficiency because 
then each club would be achieving the level of sporting performance 
commensurate with its endowment of power. 
Table 1 presents generalized likelihood-ratio tests of the null 
hypothesis, that the inefficiency effects are absent from the model and that 
decision variables are jointly insignificant. A general result for all the 
specifications is that inefficiency effects are highly significant in both the 
Italian and the Chilean leagues. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
Table 2 reports results from the estimation of the stochastic 
frontiers for the two leagues (for Italy, columns (2) to (4) relate to re-
estimation in robustness tests reported below; the lead results are in column 
(1)). The core finding is from the estimation of 𝛾𝛾 that suggests a more 
important role of stochastic shocks in managerial decisions in the Italian 
compared to the Chilean league. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
 
Among the Group I variables, the results for Italy show that the size 
of the team’s home city is indeed an important determinant of the level of 
achievement of a football club. However, the benefit from city size is 
mitigated by location in the capital city; this could reflect diminishing returns 
to city size in the sports sector (Buraimo et al., 2009) or the fact that, in the 
Italian context, the capital city usually hosts competing high level football 
clubs that split the market. Stadium capacity (for a given size of city) is 
shown to have a negative impact on performance. Possibly managers with a 
large number of seats to fill relative to the size of the local market will have 
to price tickets lower: with the inelastic demand claimed to prevail in sports 
markets in developed countries (Fort, 2006), this will imply depressed 
revenue compared with what would be expected given the size of the city. 
Results on these spatial variables are different in Chile. There population 
itself is not significant but location in Santiago de Chile assuredly is. This 
combination of results likely reflects that a high proportion of clubs are 
located in the capital and, given they all have the same value for city size, this 
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will prevent the importance of population size per se from being detected in 
the estimation. In contrast to Italy, Chilean clubs have faced restrictions on 
their ability to finance stadium development and therefore it is unsurprising 
that stadium size is a positive predictor of performance in this case. While 
results on these spatial variables display contrasts between Italy and Chile, 
the history variables yield similar findings: a history of achievement raises 
performance in the current period. Again, this is consistent with the 
importance of market size as clubs that were successful in the past will have 
collected more supporters on the way to the present. 
Our Group II variables test for effects from several individual 
categories of technical managerial decisions. The choice of coach is shown to 
matter substantially. For Italy, similar to Simmons and Frick (2008) for 
Germany, we find that the quality of the coach (as reflected in his career win-
ratio)is important but his length of experience has no independent role. 
Since it is inefficiency that is being modelled, the negative sign indicates that 
clubs who employ a coach with a better than average career record tend to 
be the clubs which are more efficient in converting status to sporting 
performance. The same is found in Chile. One of several possible 
explanations is that decision takers at some clubs undervalue coaching 
relative to player inputs. Note that we do not include a variable to account 
for the influence of a new manager (compared to the one who finished the 
previous season). The reason is that for the Chilean league we do not have 
information about the manager of teams playing in the second division the 
previous year and here we show a similar estimation in both countries for 
the purpose of comparison. However, when we run a similar estimation of 
Italy, including this variable, there are not significant changes in our results; 
the proportion of error variance due to technical inefficiencies is still 
significant (0.928 with a t-value of 12.22) and the variable new manager 
exerts a negative impact (but not significantly different from zero) on 
performance. This result accords with previous analysis by Tena and Forrest 
(2008) using match level data, who suggest that a new manager has only a 
very small effect and then only for a small number of matches (scapegoat 
hypothesis). 
Players’ wages account for the largest part of expenditure by 
professional sports teams and it is clearly key that whatever budget is 
available is spent judiciously. One trade-off clubs face is between the number 
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of players on the roster and the average quality of players (higher quality 
players are likely to be more expensive) and a striking feature from Table 1 is 
the very high variance in squad size. In both countries, clubs with a below 
average squad size appear to be more efficient than those who opt for fewer 
players. Perhaps the former enjoy greater success because of substitution of 
quality for quantity or it could be that players in a small squad benefit from 
getting more playing time. Of course, it is also (just) possible that clubs who 
employ a higher number of personnel understand that this lowers expected 
performance but accept the fact because they are risk averse and, for 
example, want to guard against the adverse consequences of an exceptional 
number of injuries. The same remark qualifies the finding that a higher 
number of goalkeepers in the squad (in Italy) appears to be associated with 
lower efficiency. But the ratios of defenders and midfielders are not 
significant explanatory variables in either country, so that there seems to be 
efficient decision taking across the clubs with respect to the balance of 
different categories of outfielder (notwithstanding that relative numbers 
display high variation across clubs). 
As an additional robustness test we analyse the impact of including a 
new decision variable in the model, new coach, that is defined as a dummy 
variable that takes value one when the manager of the team at the beginning 
of the season is different from the one at the end of the previous season. In 
this case, we are obliged to drop observations from teams playing in the 
second division the previous year as information about this variable does not 
exist for teams in the Chilean league. Results of this estimation reflect that 
now the efficiency hypothesis is rejected in both cases because the Chilean 
league is particularly inefficient in replacing old managers. However, also in 
this case the proportion of variance due to technical inefficiencies (and also 
its associate t-statistics) is substantially larger in the Italian compared to the 
Chilean league. 
From the results, a particularly tricky decision for football clubs (as 
will be the case for managers in other creative industries, such as opera or 
research) is the proportion of resources to be used on star performers. In 
football, these are usually successful strikers, defined here by the variable 
`number of high scoring players'. This attracts a negative coefficient estimate 
for both countries, implying that clubs who choose to employ none or only a 
small number will fail to reach the production frontier. The implication that 
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some clubs undervalue genuine strikers is weakened, of course, if there are 
labour market imperfections that restrict their movement away from their 
current clubs. 
    The degree of efficiency shown by a club in the Italian League 
also appears to be associated with its propensity to recruit foreign players 
compared with other clubs. Just as Kahane (2005) demonstrated that clubs 
which displayed a reluctance to employ francophone ice hockey players 
tended to pay a price in terms of lower levels of performance, so here a club 
with a below average number of foreigners is shown to fare worse as a result. 
Recent papers have highlighted the beneficial effects of foreign players in 
increasing the probability of success of the national team (Alvarez et al., 2008 
report this effect and attribute it to spillover effects that raise the ability level 
of domestic players) and in increasing the level of competitiveness in 
domestic leagues (Flores et al., 2010). However, no significant effect is found 
in Chile, probably because its weak league cannot attract qualityforeign 
footballers who would provide better value than local players. 
Broadly, the results of the model imply that, while historical and 
geographical variables intended to capture market size play their expected 
roles in both Italy and Chile, impacts from the pattern of technical decisions 
across clubs tend to have a generally lower magnitude in Chile. To test the 
robustness of these results, we analyze now the implications of two different 
set of experiments. These estimations are also shown in Table 2. More 
specifically, our first group of experiments refers possible distortions 
resulting from penalties imposed on clubs for illegal activities (mainly match 
fixing scandals) in the Italian league during seasons 2004/05, 2005/06 and 
2006/07. We eliminate these three seasons from the sample and estimate the 
model again. Main results were also robust to this experiment. 
Finally, the model was estimated for different definitions of variables 
for the Italian case. More specifically, we consider a dummy variable that 
takes value 1 when the team is located in any of the biggest four Italian cities: 
Roma, Milan, Naples and Torin also in any of the Italian province capital. 
Conclusions are not affected in either case and the null of managerial 






6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper analyzes the relationship between resource inputs and 
managerial efficiency on firms by the estimation of stochastic production 
frontiers for the top divisions in Chilean and Italian football.  Unlike 
previous research, we focus not only on coach efficiency but on the ability of 
the whole organization to transform its potential power over resources to 
the best possible outcome in terms of league points. Results indicate the 
presence of technical inefficiencies in both cases but technical inefficiencies 
play a more important role in the Italian League. 
Future lines of research are suggested by this work. First, an 
important branch of the sport literature is devoted to study the factors that 
explain differences in competitive balance; see, for example, Butler (1995), 
Flores et al. (2010) and Horowitz (1997).  Given that our results show how 
the impact of different variables on results performance depends on 
indicators of geography and history as well as managerial decisions 
undertaken by the clubs, it would be interesting to study the relative 
importance of these variables in order to explain differences in competitive 
balances for sport competitions.  
Finally, it is critical to understand why the relative importance power 
depends on the structure of national competitions. Our results suggest that 
when clubs in a competition are subject to financial constraint, power 
variables explain a more important share of results than in the case of clubs 
competing in top tournaments, while the opposite holds for managerial 
decision variables.  Developing a theoretical model that provides an 
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Table 1. Tests of hypotheses for parameters of the inefficiency frontier 
in the Italian and Chilean Leagues 
   Italy     Chile  
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (5) 
Null Hypothesis:  𝑯𝟎:𝜸 = 𝜹𝟎 = ⋯ = 𝜹𝟏𝟏 = 𝟎 















Null Hypothesis: 𝑯𝟎:𝜹𝟎 = ⋯ = 𝜹𝟏𝟏 = 𝟎 














(1) Estimation including all teams in the top division. (2) Estimation excluding 
observations from seasons 2004/05, 2005/06 and 2006/07. (3) Estimation similar to 
(1) but variable ‘Capital’ refers to the capital of any Italian province. (4) Estimation 
similar to (1) but variable ‘Capital’ refers to any of the 4 biggest Italian cities. (5) 
Estimation similar to (1) but including the variable “new manager” in the estimation 
and dropping teams that were in the second division the previous year. ***,**, * 
























   Italy Chile 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (5) 
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%  defenders 𝛿𝛿5 0.016 (0.13) 0.112 (1.03) 0.019 (0.16) 0.019 (0.16) 0.03 (0.18) 0.077 (0.84) -0.357 (-1.24) 
%  midfielders 𝛿𝛿6 0.024 (0.24) 0.102 (1.16) 0.028 (0.27) 0.023 (0.23) 0.03 (0.20) -0.125 (-1.36) -0.448 (-1.88) 
(*) 
Number of high 
scoring players 






























































































































Log-likelihood  341.23 319.83 339.00 339.08 260.95 267.09 230.60 




(1) Estimation including all teams in the top division. (2) Estimation excluding observations from seasons 
2004/05, 2005/06 and 2006/07. (3) Estimation similar to (1) but variable ‘Capital’ refers to the capital of any 
Italian province. (4) Estimation similar to (1) but variable ‘Capital’ refers to any of the 4 biggest Italian cities. (5) 
Estimation similar to (1) but including the variable “new manager” in the estimation and dropping teams that 
were in the second division the previous year. t-values are shown between brackets. ***,**, * denotes rejection at 
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1Note that this estimation would be consistent with the log transformation of a Cobb-Douglas 
functional form such as exp�𝑌𝑖,𝑡� = ∏ �𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝑥𝑖,𝑡��𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝜈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡�𝐾𝑖=1  where 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖 is the ith 
component of vector 𝛽𝛽. 
 
2In addition, distortions will result if high quality players are willing to accept a lower wage at a `big' club. 
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